In September 2025, Communist China celebrated the Chinese victory in World II, a war that Mao’s Communist forces largely did not fight by avoiding combat against the Japanese. In honor of this “heroic victory,” China staged the largest ever and well-choreographed military parade that featured Chinese strategic nuclear weapons as well as advanced technology weapons of other types (e.g., laser weapons, unmanned combat aircraft, electronic warfare systems and hypersonic missiles.) The parade demonstrated that China is “building a full-spectrum arsenal.” China’s President Xi Jinping, flanked by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un (perhaps the three most dangerous men in the world), declared that China was “never intimidated by any bullies” and stands between “good and evil, light and darkness, progress and reaction.” Not exactly an accurate description of one of the world’s worst dictatorships.
President Trump characterized Xi, Putin and Kim as “conspiring against” the United States. He was correct. Xi’s remarks and the parade were an exercise in intimidation with great emphasis on China’s nuclear capability, a significant shift away from the historical Chinese nuclear secrecy. Four Chinese strategic nuclear missiles, the DF-61 ICBM, the DF-31BJ ICBM, the JL-3 SLBM and the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile were officially displayed to the public for the first time. Also displayed for the first time was the nuclear-capable DF-26 IRBM, the “Guam Killer.”
China’s English language propaganda mouthpiece Global Times stated that the massive Chinese DF-5C ICBM, displayed during the parade, had a range of 20,000-km and that it carried nuclear and conventional multiple independently targetable warheads. The DF-5C can reportedly carry 12 nuclear warheads (the Pentagon’s China military power report says the DF-5 can carry five.) In effect, it was advertising a nuclear threat to the entire world. The message was “do not resist Chinese aggression” or “aid its victims.” Xi Jinping has ordered that the Chinese military be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027. The unprecedented post-Cold War Chinese nuclear buildup appears directly connected to this objective.
The full Chinese nuclear Triad was displayed for the first time during the parade. It showcased the large new DF-61 ICBM. This missile came as a surprise. According to noted China expert Rick Fisher, the new DF-61 ICBM uses the same mobile launcher as the powerful DF-41 ICBM, underscoring that “…this new missile has new capabilities, perhaps more than 10 multiple warheads, or new multiple hypersonic glide vehicle warheads, again perhaps intended to overcome future U.S. Golden Dome defenses.” Janes’s credits the DF-61 with up to 12 nuclear warheads.
Fisher also noted that the newly displayed version of the DF-31 ICBM “…is interesting” because the “… DF-31BJ comes in a self-contained cold-launch tube, meaning the tubes can be stored, to be available for rapid reloading, and the silos do not have to be stressed for hot launches, making them cheaper and easier to replicate if required.” An analysis by the Federation of American Scientists also concluded that the DF-31BJ was a silo-based ICBM. According to the FAS analysis:
Based on new information from the parade footage, it seems China now has nine different versions of land-based ICBMs: DF-5A, DF-5B, DF-5C, DF-27 (not yet displayed in public), DF-31A, DF-31AG, DF-31BJ, DF-41, and DF-61. Interestingly, rather than necessarily representing incremental upgrades, many of the missiles are quite distinct from one another: five are road-mobile, and four are silo-based; three are liquid-fueled, four are solid-fueled, and two are unconfirmed; at least one carries MIRVs, at least one carries an HGV, at least one carries a multi-megaton warhead, and one may even carry a conventional warhead.
Actually, in addition to the DF-61, according to U.S. government publications, China has three other MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs (the DF-41, the DF-31, and the JL-3). According to Joseph Trevithick, Deputy Editor of The War Zone, “The newly emerged DF-61 could still be just one of several all-new ICBM designs China has been working on.” STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton reportedly stated in a closed Congressional hearing that China was developing a “new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.”
In addition to the DF-61, China is reported to have under development one or two other large ICBMs, the DF-45 and the DF-51, which Fisher reports are “clearly intended to outperform the DF-41.” It is unclear whether the DF-45 and DF-51 are one or two systems. The DF-41 is widely reported to be a ten warhead missile. (The Pentagon says it carries no more than three.) In 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force indicated that the DF-41 ICBM had a 14,000-km range and could carry: 1) one 1,600-kg warhead of 5.5 megatons; 2) six 250-kg warheads of 650 kilotons; or 3) 10 165-kg warheads of 150 kilotons. This presentation has been almost completely ignored in the West. By comparison, the U.S. has one ICBM, the small 1970 vintage three warhead Minuteman III, reduced to one warhead by the New START Treaty, and which will be replaced by a single ICBM type, the Sentinel. which has not yet been flight tested and is experiencing major delays.
It has been suggested that the DF-61 is related to the previous reports concerning the DF-45 and DF-51. The DF-61 is a road-mobile ICBM. If the reported launch-weights of the DF-45 and the DF-51 are accurate, there is clearly no connection to the DF-61 because they are too heavy to be road-mobile ICBMs.
A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) publication by Joseph Rodgers and Heather Williams noted that, “The U.S. Is Losing the Arms Race.” (Emphasis in the original.) The reason is simple. U.S. strategic nuclear modernization programs are not remotely comparable in scope to those of China and Russia. Both have multiple modernization programs for every leg of their nuclear Triads. Rogers and Williams also note that, “China’s parade is particularly notable as it suggests an intent to continue expanding [its nuclear force]- it showcased a lot of nuclear platforms for only a 600-warhead arsenal.” The reason for this is that the 600+ number, the Pentagon estimate for Chinese operational nuclear weapons in mid-2024, is unreasonably low.
Unlike the United States whose strategic nuclear missiles are frozen with Cold War-level accuracy with two of the three best U.S. Cold War-era missiles, the Peacekeeper ICBM and the Advanced Cruise Missile, eliminated without replacement, China has introduced precision accuracy and low-yield nuclear warheads. The implications of these developments and the high throw-weight of Chinese theater range missiles for the possible size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal have been completely ignored by the Pentagon.The annual Department of Defense (DoD) (now the Department of War) reports on Chinese military power are the most authoritative publicly available publications, but they have a poor track record on Chinese nuclear weapons. Concerning the DoD’s estimate of 1,500 Chinese nuclear weapons in 2035, Senator Tom Cotton has written that “…given the Pentagon’s consistent underestimates in the past, it’s fair to assume that China will move even faster.”[i] Prior to 2020, the DoD’s China military reports provided little indication that China was planning a major nuclear weapons buildup. When the first Trump Administration did its Nuclear Posture Review in 2018, China was assessed (probably inaccurately) to have only 200 nuclear weapons. Yet, there was significant open source evidence of Chinese plans to expand greatly its nuclear capability even 15-20 years ago.
For the December 2024 DoD estimate of Chinese nuclear weapons to be correct all of the following assumptions would have to be true:
- All MIRVed Chinese missiles are deployed with one warhead.
- China is building ICBM launchers faster than it is building missiles and building missiles faster than warheads.
- Less capable DF-31 ICBMs are being deployed in China’s new silos.
- China has only a handful of air-delivered nuclear warheads, no nuclear-capable cruise missiles and no nuclear-capable H-6K bombers.
- China lacks nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles.
- China has only a small number of non-strategic nuclear warheads.
The probability that all of these necessary assumptions are true is essentially zero. It would be idiotic for the Chinese to pay for the development of powerful MIRVed strategic missiles and then deploy them with only a single nuclear warhead. Before undertaking the very expensive programs for nuclear delivery systems force expansion, China would certainly have initiated programs to increase its nuclear weapons production capability if this was a problem. China has enough fissile material to have deployed far more than 600+ warheads by mid-2024. It is currently producing more fissile material. The DoD’s estimate of 1,000 plus Chinese nuclear warheads for 2030 (first made in 2022) mathematically must assume a decline in Chinese nuclear warhead production rates to 70 warheads per year. This has not happened.
There is substantial evidence of Chinese possession of nuclear cruise missiles. A declassified 1995 CIA intelligence report stated that a 1995 Chinese nuclear test may have been aimed at developing “…a cruise missile warhead and may involve safety upgrades to existing systems.” In 2009, the Air Force’s National Air and Intelligence Center said the DH-10 (the ground- and sea-launched CJ-20 air-launched cruise missile) was nuclear-capable. Since 2012, three and four star generals while on active duty stated that China has nuclear cruise missiles. The 2019 DoD China military power report noted that, “Since at least 2016, Chinese media have been referring to the H-6K as a dual nuclear-conventional bomber.” A 2018 DoD Fact Sheet indicated that China had nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The 2019 DoD report pointed out that, “A number of press sources have also reported China [has] nuclear cruise missiles.” In 2021, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten said they were rapidly building them. A 2023 Japanese White Paper indicated China had nuclear-capable cruise missiles. A 2024 report of the International Institute for Strategy Studies stated that China had nuclear-capable long-range cruise missiles. The assumption of no Chinese nuclear-capable cruise missiles results in zero nuclear warheads being counted on China’s numerous H-6K bombers.
The Pentagon is likely to be considerably underestimating the number of Chinese non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. Captain (ret.) James E. Fanell, former Chief of United States Pacific Command Intelligence, has stated that China has more non-strategic nuclear weapons than the United States. In 2023, General Cotton stated that China had 1,000 dual-capable medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Other sources credit China with nuclear-capable cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and gravity bombs. Many of the missiles frequently described in the Western press as conventional are likely dual-capable (nuclear and conventional).
The Pentagon projection of a buildup of China’s nuclear warheads to 1,000+ operational warheads in 2030 and 1,500 in 2035 (in the 2022 DoD China military report) is likely to be only a fraction of actual Chinese capabilities. An estimate of the number of Chinese nuclear warheads in 2035 has not been included in the last two DoD China military power reports. These omissions were not explained. The Biden Administration apparently did not want to admit that even with their low estimates of the growth in Chinese nuclear warheads, China would achieve numerical nuclear superiority by 2035. In reality, this is likely to be accomplished well before then. China already has a nuclear-capable force with sufficient potential to carry thousands of warheads. It will grow. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) projects a growth in Chinese ICBMs from 480 to 700 and Chinese SLBMs from 72 to “at least 132” by 2035. There will also be massive increases in the number of Chinese hypersonic missiles and land-attack cruises missiles, some percentage of which will be nuclear-armed. (For some unexplained reason, the report does not project the growth in the large Chinese theater ballistic missile force.) China will also expand its nuclear-capable bomber force. China is also projected to deploy 60 Fractional Orbital Bombs by 2035.
The dramatic projected growth in the number of Chinese nuclear delivery vehicles provides additional evidence that the Pentagon’s projected growth in the number of Chinese nuclear warheads is unreasonably low. With the number of Chinese strategic nuclear delivery vehicles assessed by DIA for 2035 (which does not even count Chinese bombers), the 1,500 nuclear warheads estimated by DoD for 2035 must assume both many single warhead missiles and only a small numbers of warheads on the MIRVed missiles. Even the DIA’s projected number of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs in 2035 will have dramatically more nuclear warhead delivery potential than the DoD’s estimate for the number of Chinese nuclear weapons in 2035. Moreover, this does not even count Chinese non-strategic nuclear weapons. These ominous developments must be addressed sooner rather than later.
Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr. Schneider previously served in DoD as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.
Notes:
[i] Senator Tom Cotton, Seven Things You Can’t Say About China, (New York: HarberCollins Publishers, 2025), p. 52.