Why we were right to deploy missiles in Europe

I Helped Build Europe’s Missile Defenses. Iran’s Strike on Diego Garcia Shows Why We Were Right to Deploy Missile Defense in Europe.

Nearly fifteen years ago, I sat across negotiating tables in Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw, working with our NATO allies on what was then a controversial question:  Was the Iranian missile threat real—and urgent enough to justify building a new missile defense architecture across Europe?

At the time, the answer was far from obvious.

There were skeptics in Washington. Doubts in Europe. Opposition from Russia. Questions about cost, escalation, and whether we were overreacting to a threat that had not yet fully materialized.  But we moved forward anyway.

Working with a dedicated interagency team from the State Department and the Department of Defense—and in close partnership with allies in Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain—we built what became the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA):

• A forward based radar in Turkey
• Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland
• Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors, homeported in Spain

At the time, it required a leap of strategic foresight.  Today, it looks like necessity.

That reality came into sharp focus last week.  Iran launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles at the U.S.-U.K. base at Diego Garcia—roughly 2,500 miles (4,000 km) away—demonstrating a capability that many had long suspected but had not yet seen operationalized.

One missile failed in flight. Another was reportedly intercepted by a U.S. Navy destroyer using an SM-3 interceptor.

Whether these two particular missiles hit is beside the point. The real significance is not where Iran aimed—but what it proved.  By striking at a target roughly 4,000 kilometers away, Iran demonstrated that it can now hold at risk targets across much—if not all—of Europe.

Berlin, Paris, Rome—these are no longer theoretical range calculations on a briefing slide. They are now within a demonstrated strike envelope.  And that changes the strategic map.  Last week’s Iranian strike demonstrated that the threat we anticipated fifteen years ago has now fully materialized—and validated the strategic logic behind NATO’s missile defense architecture.

If Iran Fires at Europe, It Will Not Get a Free Shot

To date, Iran has not fired ballistic missiles at U.S. bases or allied territory in Europe, though NATO missile defense assets have intercepted several Iranian missiles that targeted the U.S. air base located at Incirlik, Turkey, which is technically in Asia.

But if it does, the outcome will not be predetermined.  Iran will not get a free shot.  That is not luck. It is not coincidence. It is the result of decisions made more than a decade ago.

The system we built—the EPAA architecture—was designed precisely for this moment:

• To defend NATO territory
• To protect population centers
• To shield deployed forces

And critically, to send a message: Missile attacks will not achieve their intended political or military effects.  From a personal perspective, it is deeply gratifying to see something you helped build—often amid skepticism—perform its intended mission under real-world conditions. But it is also a reminder of something else.  What we built then is now being tested by a more dangerous threat environment than we originally anticipated.

Missile Defense Worked—But the Problem Is Getting Harder

The EPAA system was designed for a different era:

• Smaller numbers of missiles
• More predictable trajectories
• A narrower set of adversaries

That world is gone.  Today’s threat environment is defined by:

• Larger and more diverse missile arsenals
• Increasing range and precision
• Integration with drones and other low-cost systems
• The potential for large-scale salvo attacks designed to overwhelm defenses

At the same time, we are confronting a growing imbalance of using high-cost interceptors  and fighter aircraft against increasingly cheap offensive systems. That is not just a budget issue. It is a strategic problem—and over time, a strategic vulnerability.

We Need to Do Again What We Did Before—Only Faster

The lesson of EPAA is not simply that missile defense works, as we have seen in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.  It is that it works when we anticipate the threat—not react to it.  We saw the trajectory of Iran’s missile program early. We invested ahead of the threat.
We built a system with allies. And because of that, when the moment came—we were ready. Now we need to do it again. But this time, the challenge is greater.

As I have written elsewhere, that means, among other things:

• Replenish and expand theater missile defense interceptor inventories. The rapid depletion of U.S. and allied stockpiles—particularly for Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3—driven by ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East underscores the urgent need to rebuild capacity while scaling production for future contingencies.
• Invest in emerging, lower-cost defensive technologies. High-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems offer a pathway to breaking the cost-exchange imbalance that currently favors inexpensive drones and missiles over costly interceptors.
• Develop and operationalize “left-of-launch” capabilities. The United States and its allies must enhance their ability to disrupt, disable, or destroy missile threats before they are launched, reducing reliance on interceptors alone.
• Deepen operational integration with allies and partners. A more fully networked and interoperable missile defense architecture will strengthen collective defense, improve burden-sharing, and enhance overall effectiveness.
• Expand Foreign Military Sales and coproduction arrangements. Increasing the export of systems such as SM-6 and THAAD—while pursuing coproduction agreements—will strengthen allied capabilities, reinforce industrial linkages, and expand global production capacity.

And most importantly:  Designing systems for scale—not just for limited attacks, but for saturation.

A Final Reflection

When we were negotiating EPAA, we were often asked: “What if the threat never materializes?”

It was a reasonable question.  But it was the wrong one.  Because the real question—the one policymakers must always ask—is this: “What happens if it does—and we are not ready?”

This week, we saw what happens when the threat materializes.  Fortunately, we were ready. But readiness is not a permanent condition.  It is something that must be built, sustained, and adapted.  Because in this business, capabilities matter—but so does the foresight to counter them.

The United States and its allies showed that foresight once. The question is whether we will show it again—before our adversaries force the answer upon us.

Frank A. Rose is president of Chevalier Strategic Advisors, a strategic advisory firm focused on the intersection of geopolitics and defense technology.  He previously served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy, a Professional Staff Member on the House Armed Services Committee, and as a Policy Advisor at the U.S. Defense Department.