With the so-called “snapback” mechanism against Iran – part of the 2015 “Iran nuclear deal” (or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) – set to take effect this Sunday, Sept. 28, public demonstrations by Iranians, including several in New York City throughout September, have been dramatizing the widespread desire for peace and stability in the nation at the epicenter of much of the ongoing turmoil and terror in the Middle East.
The snapback process, restoring six U.N. Security Council resolutions, would include the following sanctions:
1. It would reimpose bans on uranium enrichment and other activities related to nuclear weapons in Iran.
2. It would reinstate the U.N.’s arms embargo and restrict missile and drone transfers to and from Iran.
3. It would impose new asset freezes, travel bans and financial restrictions on those involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
Before and after the recent 12-day war with Israel, Iranian dictator Ali Khamenei sought to maintain a state of inertia – neither war nor peace. Remaining in such a situation carried clear advantages for him:
* He could mobilize his forces and prevent their erosion.
* He could preserve the structure of Iran’s nuclear program, even if enrichment was temporarily halted.
However, the 12-day war accelerated developments and led the international community to the conclusion that the Iranian regime is the central source of regional crises and must be contained. Although belated, the snapback was an undeniable necessity for regional peace. At the same time, the Islamic Republic sought to exploit divisions between Europe and the United States to preserve its strategic inertia.
The activation of the snapback mechanism forces the regime out of this stalemate, leaving it with two possible paths:
* Either the regime halts enrichment inside the country, permanently abandoning its nuclear ambitions and subsequently scaling back its missile program and proxy networks.
* Or, as some factions within the regime advocate, it withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and openly pursues nuclear weapons.
This situation has given rise to unprecedented alternative voices within the regime. For example, last Thursday, Sept. 18, Hamid Asefi, a reformist figure, wrote on his Telegram channel:
“In these circumstances, the only remaining chance is for [President] Masoud Pezeshkian, together with the Foreign Minister and armed with full written authority from the Supreme Leader, to reach an agreement through direct and official negotiations with the United States, while simultaneously conducting necessary talks within the European Union framework, so that diplomacy can be revived and the Snapback process halted.”
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, abandoning its nuclear program – and by extension its missile arsenal and proxy forces – amounts to surrender. Such a scenario carries enormous risks for the regime, greatly increasing the likelihood of its collapse.
Since the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, the theocratic regime has pursued a long-term strategy revolving around the slogans “Death to Israel” and “Death to America.” This strategy rested on nuclear capabilities, missile capabilities and proxy forces. Removing these three pillars would collapse the regime’s aggressive architecture and result in grave consequences for Khamenei. Like any dictator, his foremost concern is the survival of his rule.
Thus, in Khamenei’s view, dismantling this strategy would accelerate his regime’s downfall – even if it would be much better for the Iranian people. For this reason, Khamenei declared in his Aug. 24 speech that there is no resolvable issue between Iran and the United States, thereby rejecting any shutdown of the nuclear project.
The 1988 experience illustrates this pattern: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, was forced to accept a ceasefire with Iraq, which he described as “drinking from the poisoned chalice.” To maintain his grip on power afterward, he oversaw the massacre of some 30,000 political prisoners, instilling terror and preserving the regime temporarily.
Today, however, the situation is different: Ali Khamenei is far weaker than Khomeini was at that time and is less capable of carrying out repression on such a massive scale. It is therefore unlikely he would voluntarily abandon Iran’s nuclear program and, in his own words, “surrender.”
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Iranians in the diaspora gathered in Europe on Sept. 6, and thousands more are gathering in New York City on Tuesday, Sept. 23, to call for the activation of the snapback mechanism. For them, this measure represents the path toward the long-awaited liberation of the Iranian people and the beginning of a new era of reconstruction and prosperity.
It would also warn the mullahs in power that relying on repressive measures and killing fields to maintain power are no longer options.
The international community is thus being called to champion the just demands of the long-suffering Iranian people.